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TREATING EXPERTS LIKE ORDINARY WITNESSES:
RECENT TRENDS IN DISCOVERY OF
TESTIFYING EXPERTS UNDER
FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 26(b)(4)
In 1970, the Supreme Court adopted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(b)(4)1 to govern discovery of an adverse party's expert information.
The provisions of Rule 26(b)(4) were a noticeable departure from past
judicial restrictions on expert discovery.2 Scholarly commentary3 and
1. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) [hereinafter Rule 26(b)(4)]. The rule provides:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts,
otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired
or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person
whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the subject
matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance of the facts and
opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of the grounds for each
opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, subject
to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of
this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been retained
or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or preparation for trial
and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided in Rule 35(b) or
upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is impracticable for the party
seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party seeking
discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to discovery under
subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with respect to discovery ob-
tained under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) of this rule the court may require, and with respect
to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule the court shall require, the
party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion of the fees and expenses rea-
sonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert.
Id.
2. See generally C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2029
(1970). "[S]ome courts had objected to the discovery of expert information on the grounds variously
that [it] was privileged, or that it was protected as work product, or that it would be unfair if one
party could learn through discovery what the other party has paid the expert for." Id. (footnotes
omitted).
The drafters rejected most of these court imposed restrictions. More specifically, the drafters
rejected outright both the attorney-client and work product privileges. They ameliorated perceived
unfairness by providing for qualified reimbursement in subdivision (b)(4)(C), limiting discovery to
testifying experts in subdivision (b)(4)(A), and implying in the committee's notes a possible timing
restriction on discovery of testifying experts. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's
note.
The doctrine of unfairness "refiect[s] the fear that one side will benefit unduly from the other's
better preparation." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note. See also Schuyler v.
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Judge Thomsen's opinion in Knighton v. Villian & Fassio Co.4 provided
the impetus for enactment of Rule 26(b)(4). The centerpiece for expert
discovery under the rule is subdivision (b)(4)(A), which provides poten-
tially unlimited discovery of testifying experts.'
OVERVIEW
Subdivision (b)(4)(A)'s primary purpose is to facilitate effective cross-
examination and rebuttal of expert testimony.6 For this reason, each
party may discover through interrogatories the expert's identity, the sub-
stantive facts and opinions about which each expert is expected to testify,
and a summary of the grounds for each opinion.7 Further discovery,
through depositions and motions to compel production, and the scope or
United Air Lines, 10 F.R.D. 111, 113 (M.D. Pa. 1950) (discovery of expert's report would "penalize
the diligent and place a premium on laziness"); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Part Two, An Empirical Study and a Proposal, 1977 U. ILL.
L.F. 169, 191 [hereinafter Graham, Part Two] ("The concept of 'unfairness' focuses on the risk of
rewarding a lazy examining counsel whose case is aided as a result of the discovery of his adversary's
expert.")
3. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L. REV.
455 (1962); Long, Discovery and Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 WASH. L.
REV. 665 (1964). The Advisory Committee's note cites both articles approvingly.
4. 39 F.R.D. 11 (D.Md.1965).
5. Testifying experts are those experts an opponent expects to call at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26
(b)(4)(A)(i). Nontestifying experts, retained by the discoveree but not expected to be called, are
exempt from discovery under subdivision (b)(4)(B), absent a showing of exceptional circumstances.
6. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4) advisory committee's note. The drafters provide a succinct state-
ment of the adverse effects early judicial restrictions had on the trial process:
In cases [where expert testimony is pivotal], a prohibition against discovery.., produces in
acute form the very evils that discovery has been created to prevent. Effective cross-exami-
nation of an expert witness requires advance preparation. The lawyer even with the help of
his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert
will take or the data on which he will base his judgment on the stand .... Similarly,
effective rebuttal requires advance knowledge of the line of testimony of the other side. If
the latter is foreclosed by a rule against discovery, then the narrowing of issues and elimi-
nation of surprise which discovery normally produces are frustrated.
Id. (citations omitted). See also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc. 116 F.R.D. 533, 536-
37 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Carter-Wallace, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Indus., 553 F. Supp. 45, 52 (S.D.N.Y.
1982); 4 J. MOORE, J. LucAs & G. GROTHER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 26.66[3] (3rd. ed.
1987).
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(i). The interrogatories provided in step one of subdivision
(b)(4)(A) are "essentially ... designed to afford the questioner notice of the basic arguments the
responding litigant intends to press at trial." Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 30 (M.D. Pa.
1980). Failure of the discoveree to respond may lead to exclusion of expert testimony at trial. Id.
Accord Rosemount, Inc. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 727 F.2d 1540, 1549-50 (Fed. Cir. 1984)
(testimony on test results in a patent dispute properly excluded when proponent failed to disclose the
identity of his testifying expert in response to opponent's interrogatories).
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conditions of such discovery is subject to the court's discretion.'
The meager "substance and summary" provided under subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(i) is often insufficient for effective cross-examination and rebut-
tal.9 One scholar argues that, given this insufficiency, the way a court
exercises its discretion under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) "will effectively
control the ability of counsel to prepare.. . ." to Not surprisingly, com-
mentators have routinely criticized subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) for leaving
the courts without any substantive standards to evaluate motions for fur-
ther discovery.11 In practice, the discretionary clause seems responsible
for an early line of cases perpetuating the work product doctrine in ex-
pert discovery.' 2 However, this restrictive response to Rule 26(b)(4) met
with swift disapproval.' 3
8. The rules allow further discovery only upon motion of the discoverer and an affirmative
court order. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). Additionally, under subdivision (b)(4)(C)(ii) the court
may require the discoverer to pay a fair portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by his
adversary in obtaining facts and opinions from the expert. Subdivision (b)(4)(C)(i), on the other
hand, mandates that the discovering party pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent responding
to further discovery. These provisions meet the argument that it is unfair to require the testifying
expert to disgorge to the discoverer information paid for by the adversary. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)
advisory committee's note.
9. Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part One, An Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 903-08 [hereinafter Graham, Part One].
10. Id.
11. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2031 (Supp. 1987). See also Connors, A New Look at
an Old Concern - Protecting Expert Information from Discovery Under the Federal Rules, 18 DuQ. L.
REv. 271, 272 (1980) ("In this area of the law very much... [is] left to the whim, sometimes called
'discretion,' of each particular judge.").
One explanation offered for the Advisory Committee's failure to articulate a baseline standard or
specific scope restrictions in expert discovery was an alleged East-West rift on the Committee. Gra-
ham, Part One, supra note 9, at 921-22. According to Graham, the Westerners practiced and advo-
cated full-blown discovery of experts. The Easterners adhered to the various theories of expert
information privilege or the unfairness doctrine. The Committee compromised and left the matter to
the courts. Id.
12. See, eg., Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202, 205 (M.D. Miss. 1972) (motion
to compel production of engineering reports, prepared by experts in anticipation of litigation and in
response to counsel's queries, must fail because documents are work product and proponent failed to
show undue hardship in obtaining same information elsewhere); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510,
511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970) (plaintiff's motion to compel production of report prepared by defendant's
medical expert denied, absent a showing of substantial need).
13. In essence, courts had attempted to superimpose FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) (codification of
the work product doctrine) [hereinafter Rule 26(b)(3)] onto Rule 26(b)(4), thereby shielding expert
information from the discoverer, a practice explicitly rejected by the Advisory Committee. See Gra-
ham, Part One, supra note 9, at 926 (labelling this analysis "clearly erroneous"). Federal courts later
agreed. See, eg., Beverage Marketing Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp.
1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) ("The weight of authority is... that the work product rule does not
apply to experts... expected to testify."); Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Div., United Aircraft Corp.,
Washington University Open Scholarship
790 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 66:787
Recently, courts have utilized the flexibility of subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii)
to vastly expand discovery of an adverse party's expert information. This
Note will focus on these recent trends of expanded discovery and the
convergent issue.of discovery limitations. 14 Part I deals with motions to
compel production of drafts and preliminary reports prepared by testify-
ing experts. Part II considers motions to compel production of founda-
tion materials.5 Part III shifts the focus to expert depositions. Finally,
Part IV examines the propriety of imposing limitations on the process.
I. PRODUCTION OF DRAFTS AND PRELIMINARY REPORTS
Production of, an expert trial witness' final report is routine in most
jurisdictions.' 6 However, disclosure of the final report alone may fail to
satisfy subdivision (b)(4)(A)'s goal of effective cross-examination.",
The-district court's opinion in Quadrini v. Sikorsky Aircraft Division,
United Aircraft Corp.'8 reflects this concern. In Quadrini, the court or-
der production of all drafts or preliminary reports prepared by Sikorsky's
expert in anticipation of Quadrini's tort action.' 9 The court stated that
"[d]iscovery of [preliminary] reports.., can guard against the possibility
of a sanitized presentation at trial, purged of less favorable opinions ex-
74 F.R.D. 594, 595 n.1 (D. Conn. 1977) (Rule 26(b)(4) governs discovery from experts, not
26(b)(3)); Herbst v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 530-31 (D. Conn. 1975) ("Once
the traditional problem of [unfairness] has been solved, there is no reason to treat an expert differ-
ently than any other witness").
14. Heeding the advice of Wright and Miller that "pre-1970 cases must be resorted to with
discrimination and care," this Note will review only post-1970 case law. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra
note 2, § 2023 (1970).
15. Foundation materials are materials that the expert relied on in preparation for his testi-
mony at trial. See supra text acompanying note 39.
16. See, eg., Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 533, 537 (N.D. Cal.
1987); Beverage Marketing, 563 F. Supp. at 1013; American Steel Products v. Penn Central Corp.,
110 F.R.D. 151, 153 (S.D. N.Y. 1986). Compare Baise v. Alewel's Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 98 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (conditioning production of report on minimal showing of need and satisfaction of reciprocal
obligation of discoverer to produce his own report).
In addition to case law, at least six districts have local rules providing for production of expert
reports. Graham, Part One, supra note 9, at 931 n.136.
17. [T]he final expert report may vary substantially from the expert's draft report often
because of direct input from the attorney. The result of the drafting process is to make the
final report reflect more closely what the attorney would like the expert to testify to at trial.
The drafting process also tends to make the final report more conclusory than the draft
report.
Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 188 (footnote omitted).
18. 74 F.R.D. 594 (D. Conn. 1977).
19. Id. at 594.
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pressed at an earlier date."20 Two subsequent cases fleshed out the exact
contours of the Quadrini holding.
The first, In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig.,21 involved
IBM's motion to compel production of expert documents that IBM
claimed were necessary for effective cross-examination.22 Though cogni-
zant of the Quadrini concerns, the court refused to allow IBM to engage
in a fishing expedition for every document the experts had ever written.23
The court deemed the motion to compel overboard and suggested that
IBM's intentions were to gain impeachment evidence or facts favorable
to its own case.24 The court found these purposes impermissible under
Rule 26(b)(4). 25
The most recent pronouncement on draft documents came in Hewlett-
Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc.26 In 1984, Bausch & Lomb filed a
petition for reexamination in the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO),
challenging a Hewlett-Packard (H-P) patent.27 One month later, Bausch
& Lomb filed suit against H-P in district court, making the same claim.
The central issue in both proceedings was the "state of the art" at the
time H-P filed with the PTO.28 H-P retained an expert, Holmes, to act as
consultant throughout both proceedings. Holmes submitted a declara-
tion to the PTO that defended H-P's patent.2 9 Bausch & Lomb's argu-
ments at the PTO reexamination hearing were unsuccessful.30 Thus H-P
planned to call Holmes as an expert witness at trial, hoping his analysis
of the "state of the art" would again prevail.3" Pursuant to subdivision
20. Id. at 595. A number of courts have cited Quadrini approvingly. See, e.g., American Steel
Prods. Corp. v. Penn Central Corp., 110 F.R.D. 151, 153 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); Beverage Marketing
Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig., 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977). But see Feller v.
Board of Educ., State of Conn., 583 F. Supp 1526, 1529-30 (D. Conn. 1984) (motion to compel
production of draft report denied because "the need for such extraordinary discovery [had not] been
suggested on the record").
21. 77 F.R.D. 39 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id at 41-42.
24. Id.
25. Id. But cf. Boring v. Keller, 97 F.R.D. 404, 408 (D. Colo. 1983) (facilitation of impeach-
ment permissible end of motion to compel production of foundation materials).
26. 116 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
27. Id. at 534-35.
28. Id. at 535.
29. Id. at 534-35.
30. Id. at 535.
31. Id.
1988]
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(b)(4)(A)(ii), Bausch & Lomb filed a motion to compel production of
Holmes' draft declaration.3 2
Despite the fact that Holmes prepared the draft for the reexamination
proceeding, not trial,33 the court granted Bausch & Lomb's motion to
compel production.34 The court reasoned that holding the draft immune
from discovery would exalt form over substance given the contemporane-
ity of the two proceedings, identity of issues, and H-P's use of duplicative
expert opinion.35
Recognizing that resolution of the issue under Rule 26(b)(4) was ques-
tionable, the court also considered H-P's work product claim.3 6 The
court rejected application of Rule 26(b)(3) in this context, stating that
the work product doctrine protects the lawyer's work, not the retained
expert's work.3 7 Additionally, the court believed draft discovery would
encourage experts to formulate their own opinions, thereby enhancing
32. Id.
33. Rule 26(b)(4) limits discovery to expert information acquired or developed in anticipation
of litigation or for trial. H-P's counsel argued that the draft declaration was work product, prepared
in anticipation of litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3). By arguing the expert did not prepare the
document solely for purposes of the PTO reexamination but "with an eye toward litigation," counsel
gave added support to the court's conclusion that the Holmes draft was a proper subject of discovery
under Rule 26(b)(4). Hewelett-Packard, 116 F.R.D. at 538. Conversely, if counsel had failed to
argue that the expert prepared the document in anticipation of litigation, it would be freely discover-
able under FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) (the general relevancy standard for discovery of unprivileged
matter) because Holmes would be considered an actor or viewer, not an expert, and treated for
discovery purposes as an ordinary witness. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
Accord Lee v. Knutson, 112 F.R.D. 105, 108 (N.D. Miss. 1986); Nelco Corp. v. Slate Elec. Inc,, 80
F.R.D. 411, 414 (E.D.N.Y. 1978).
34. 116 F.R.D. at 548.
35. Id. at 537. The court also deemed disclosure of the draft declaration necessary for effective
cross-examination of Holmes at trial. Id. at 536-37.
36. Id. at 538.
37. Id. at 539. The court did not consider and defense counsel did not raise the argument that
H-P initially retained Holmes as an engineering consultant for the PTO dispute and only later did
Holmes take on the role of expert trial witness. See supra note 33. In fact, the court referred to
Holmes as an "expert consultant" in one part of the opinion. 116 F.R.D. at 535. Therefore, though
H-P's counsel acted "with an eye toward litigation," discovery of the draft declaration would require
a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3). See also Beverage
Marketing Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013, 1014 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (stating in dicta: "It is conceivable that an expert could be retained to testify and in addition
to advise counsel outside of the subject of his testimony. Under such a circumstance it might be
possible to claim a work product privilege if this delineation were clearly made."). In Hewlett-
Packard, counsel initially retained Holmes for advice outside the litigation setting. It requires no
stretch of the imagination to suppose H-P would not have called Holmes to testify at trial had the
PTO reexamination favored Bausch & Lomb. Therefore, the argument that he served two roles
seems plausible.
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the truth-finding process.3 8
Taken together, these cases indicate several courts' willingness to com-
pel production of draft documents prepared by a testifying expert en-
route to formulating an opinion. In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Anti-
trust Litig. appears to set the outer boundary for these requests at the
time the adversary retains an expert in anticipation of litigation. On the
other hand, Hewlett-Packard represents one court's willingness to allow
discovery beyond this boundary.
II. PRODUCTION OF FOUNDATION MATERIALS
Courts have not limited motions to compel production under subdivi-
sion (b)(4)(A)(ii) to documents drafted by testifying experts. Recently,
the federal courts have also expanded the discovery of foundation materi-
als,39 that is, materials relied on by experts in forming opinions.' More-
over, efforts to shield this information from opposing counsel may meet
with exclusionary rulings at trial.41 For this reason, the contours of
foundation discovery have become increasingly significant to the
practitioner.
For example, in Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,42 the district
court approved the discovery of materials that a testifying expert expects
to rely on. In Fauteck, an employment discrimination class action, the
plaintiffs filed a motion to compel production of Ward's personnel
38. 116 F.R.D. at 539-40. Implicit in this rationale is the concern that attorneys shape expert
opinion greatly in the latter stages of report-drafting. See supra note 17. By requiring disclosure of
draft documents, opposing counsel and the fact-finder can assess the decree of attorney influence and
the objectivity of the expert's opinion. The court opined: "[We are] not interested in furthering the
corruption of the truth finding process by announcing doctrine that has the effect of approving and
reinforcing the practice of lawyers formulating and writing opinions that are presented to the outside
world as the independent opinions of 'technical experts.'" 116 F.R.D. at 539.
39. See supra note 15.
40. See, e.g., American Steel Prods. Corp. v. Penn Central Corp., 110 F.R.D. 151, 153
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("The document request... essentially seeks production of all documents relied
upon by the expert in forming his opinions and any preliminary and final reports that have already
been prepared respecting the subject matter of this action."); Cf Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc., No.
B-76-261 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 1979) (WESTLAW, DCTU database) (notice of deposition included direc-
tion to expert to bring "any and all documentary evidence, treatises, statistical compilations, studies,
analyses, or any other documents or statistics upon which the deponent has relied or expects to rely
... in reaching an expert opinion .... ").
41. See, e.g., Corby v. Schneider Tank Lines, Inc., 741 F.2d 1015, 1019 (7th Cir. 1984) (De-
fendant's practice of withholding witness statement from expert until after the plaintiff's deposition
of expert "fundamentally unfair"; ordered that Defendant's expert not refer to the statement nor
include details of statement in his opinion testimony.).
42. 91 F.R.D. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
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records. g3 The court granted the plaintiffs' motion even though Ward
had not yet encoded the information or provided a database to its ex-
pert.' The court rejected Ward's argument that disclosure was prema-
ture and unfair and emphasized that discovery would materially advance
the litigation and facilitate effective cross-examination of the defense
expert.45
In Heitmann v. Concrete Pipe Machinery,46 a Missouri district court
resolved a potential conflict between subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and
(b)(4)(B). The plaintiff in Heitmann sought production of a report pre-
pared by Concrete Pipe's nontestifying expert47 and relied upon by the
company's testifying expert.48 Concrete Pipe argued that the court
should grant the plaintiff's motion only on a subdivision (b)(4)(B) show-
ing of exceptional circumstances because the company had no intention
of calling the report writer at trial.49 The court held the company lost
the subdivision (b)(4)(B) protection when it voluntarily transmitted the
report to its testifying expert, who then relied on the report.50
Eliasen v. Hamilton51 extended the Heitmann rationale. In Eliasen,
the court affirmed a magistrate's order that compelled production of a
nontestifying expert's report reviewed but rejected by the plaintiff's trial
expert.52 The court stated: "Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) should not be limited
to documents relied upon by the testifying expert in reaching opinions.
Documents considered but rejected ... [may] in fact ... be even more
important for cross-examination than those actually relied upon .... ,,53
The rationale of Eliasen, if followed in other districts, would force
counsel to screen all data transmitted to a testifying expert, whether used
as foundation material or not. Similar concerns arose from a recent line
43. Id. at 398.
44. Id. at 398-99.
45. Id. at 398. To prevent abuse of the discovery process, however, the court imposed a recip-
rocal disclosure obligation on the plaintiffs and required them to pay 50% of the compilation costs
incurred by Ward. Id. at 399.
46. 98 F.R.D. 740 (E.D. Mo. 1983).
47. Nontestifying experts are experts retained by the discoveree but who are not expected to
testify at trial. See supra note 5.
48. 98 F.R.D. at 741.
49. Id. Subdivision (b)(4)(B) prohibits discovery of nontestifying experts absent a showing of
exceptional circumstances.
50. Id. at 743. The court also cited the plaintiff's need for the report to enhance effective cross-
examination of Concrete Pipe's testifying expert. Id.
51. 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Il1. 1986).
52. Id. at 397 nn.l-2, 399-400 n.5.
53. Id. at 400 n.5 (citations omitted).
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of cases that addressed the issue of discoverability of attorney work prod-
uct provided to trial experts. 4
In the seminal case of Boring v. Keller,55 the plaintiff's attorney
learned that a defense expert had reviewed an unedited deposition sum-
mary prepared by defense counsel 6.5  The plaintiff filed a motion to com-
pel production of the document. 7 The court held the work product
immunity waived when the testifying expert utilized counsel's summary
as foundation material, even though the court recognized that a deposi-
tion summary is opinion work product.
5 8
In effect, Boring turned Rule 26(b)(4) on its head. The Advisory Com-
mittee intended Rule 26(b)(4) to remove work product protection from
expert discovery.59 Ironically, the Boring court used subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) to allow discovery of core work product. However, other
courts were quick to repudiate Boring's free-wheeling approach to foun-
dation discovery.'
The strongest rebuff came from the Third Circuit in Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp.61 In Bogosian, class representatives petitioned for a writ of
mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order compelling pro-
duction of opinion work product shown to class experts.62 Consistent
54. See generally Note, Interaction Between 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Conflict and Confusion in the Federal Courts, 9 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 319 (Fall 1985).
55. 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
56. Id. at 404.
57. Id. at 405.
58. Id. at 407. The mental impressions of an attorney are normally absolutely privileged. FED.
R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(3). The court, however, believed plaintiff's counsel needed the material to impeach
the expert witness. 97 F.R.D. at 408. The Boring court gained additional support from an earlier
case, which stated in dicta: "there will be hereafter powerful reason to hold that materials consid-
ered work product should be withheld from prospective witnesses if they are to be withheld from
opposing parties." Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
59. See supra note 2.
60. See, e.g., Guadalupi v. St. Therese Hosp., No 82-C-2083 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 21, 1985)
(WESTLAW, DCTU database) ("[I]n order to obtain [work product]... [Defendant] must meet Rule
26(b)(3)'s substantial need and undue hardship requirements, and, even if [defendant] meets such
requirements, [he] is not entitled to 'core work product,' that is, attorney's mental impressions, con-
clusions, opinions and legal theories."); Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 97 (W.D. Mo. 1983)
("[I]tems ... not work product gain no special protected status merely because they are sent to an
expert, but conversely, attorney work product does not lose its special status merely because it is
transmitted to an expert.").
61. 738 F.2d 587 (3rd Cir. 1984).
62. Id. at 588. Defendant's motion to compel production of approximately 115 documents,
alleged by the plaintiffs to contain counsel's mental impressions and thought processes, met with the
district court's approval. Id. at 590-91.
1988]
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with Boring, the district court had subordinated Rule 26(b)(3)'s work
product protection to Rule 26(b)(4) discovery. The court of appeals
disagreed with this construction of Rule 26(b)(3). 64 The court held that
the marginal value of disclosure failed to outweigh the strong policy
against core work product discovery.65
In summary, production of foundation materials has undergone an ex-
pansive trend similar to that of draft reports discussed in Part I. Memo-
randa, data, and other materials, with the possible exception of work
product, that an expert actually considered or expected to rely on are
freely discoverable.
III. DEPOSITIONS
Subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) is most commonly used to order an adverse
testifying expert to appear for a deposition.6 6 The likelihood of a court-
ordered deposition may hinge on the sufficiency of answers to interroga-
tories provided under subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i). 67
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure leave the scope of deposition
questioning, like that of motions to compel production, to the court's
discretion.6 8 Debate over the appropriate scope of an expert deposition is
traceable to Knighton v. Villian & Fassio Co.,69 a case predating the 1970
63. Id. at 590-91.
64. Specifically, the district court found that the proviso to Rule 26(b)(3) that it is "[s]ubject to
the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)" compelled the discovery order. Id. at 594. The court of appeals
construed the proviso as limiting only the first sentence of the rule (governing ordinary work prod-
uct) and not the second, which sets up an absolute bar to discovery of core work product. Id.
65. Id. at 595. The court modified the production order and allowed redaction of the memo-
randa to protect legal theories and the attorney-expert dialectic. See infra notes 127-29 and accom-
panying text. The court deemed disclosure of the facts sufficient for purposes of cross-examination.
The court refused to inquire into counsel's role in assisting the expert's opinion formulation. Id.
Contra Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 533, 539-40 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
For a discussion of this court's opposing viewpoint, see supra note 38.
66. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2031 (Supp. 1987). Attorneys utilize depositions for
various reasons. These include: 1) inquiring about the expert's background, experience and educa-
tion; 2) assessing the valueof a case and prospects for settlement; and 3) learning about the opinions
the expert is expected to give at trial. Id.
67. See Clough, RxforDefense-Aggressive Use of the Amended Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
38 INS. COUNS. J. 354, 357 (1971) (court less likely to order an expert deposition when answers to
interrogatories contain sufficient detail for purposes of cross-examination). See also infra notes 99-
102 and accompanying text. On the other hand, studies of actual pretrial practice indicate that the
parties often agree informally to mutual expert depositions. See Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at
184.
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
69. 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965).
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amendments. In Knighton, the court rejected the concept that a deposi-
tion might serve as a preliminary cross-examination.7" The court prohib-
ited questioning intended to uncover impeachment material or auxiliary
facts and opinions.7'
The status of the Knighton limitations is unclear because subdivison
(b)(4)(A)(ii) is devoid of any express scope restrictions and the Advisory
Committee's note remains silent on the issue.72 The restrictive analysis
appears to be judicially disfavored for impeachment material discovery.7 3
On the other hand, early cases and commentary restrictively interpreted
subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) to prevent discovery of auxiliary facts or opin-
ions during an expert deposition.74
One response to unfairness arguments is to limit deposition inquiries to
expected testimony.75 Whether the limitation is appropriate continues to
trouble the courts. In Hubbard v. Rubbermaid, Inc.,76 for example, the
court considered the defendant's request to depose the plaintiffs' expert
and inquire about interviews with class members. The court reaffirmed
Knighton's prohibition on discovery of auxiliary facts or opinions.
77
However, the court granted the defendant's motion because the expert
relied on the interviews to shape his opinion.78
In Weekley v. Transcraft, Inc. , the Northern District of Indiana es-
poused a different viewpoint. In Weekley, a products liability action, the
70. Id. at 13.
71. Id. at 13-14. Auxiliary facts are those upon which the testifying expert did not rely. Auxil-
iary opinions are those which counsel does not expect the expert to relate. Id.
72. For a discussion of the drafter's possible intentions, see infra notes 88-91 and accompanying
text.
73. See, eg., Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 533 (D. Colo.
1977) ("In fact, one of the purposes of [a deposition] is to obtain information for use on cross-
examination and for the impeachment of witnesses.") (quoting United States v. International Busi-
ness Mach. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 215, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 1974)).
74. See Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11, 14 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (motion for leave to take
expert's deposition denied because discoverer sought information beyond expert's expected testi-
mony); Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumberman's Casualty Mut. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205, 210
(S.D.N.Y. 1973) (same); WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2031. Considering the specific lan-
guage "subject to such restrictions as to scope... as the court may deem appropriate" found in
subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii), the authors state: "It is thought the court may wish to restrict the deposi-
tion to the opinions that the expert is expected to give on direct examination at trial, and in this way
prevent the discovering party from using the deposition to establish his own affirmative case." Id.
75. See supra note 2.
76. No. B-76-261 (D. Md. Oct. 17, 1979) (WESTLAW, DCTU database).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 113 F.R.D. 683 (N.D. Ind. 1987).
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plaintiffs retained a metallurgist to analyze allegedly defective welds and
offer his expert opinion . 0 The plaintiffs admitted the defendant's right
to depose their expert but requested, as a precondition, an order that the
defendant partially reimburse them for expert fees and expenses.81 The
court refused the plaintiffs' request because the defendant sought to learn
only the nature of the claim and prepare for effective cross-examina-
tion. 2 The court added, however, that should the defendant attempt to
use the plaintiffs' expert or test results for its case-in-chief, the defendant
must reimburse the plaintiffs.8 3 Hence, Weekley implicitly disavowed
Knighton's prohibition of questioning intended to uncover auxiliary facts
or opinions.8 4
The recent trend of expanded discovery of experts' draft reports, foun-
dation materials, and in expert depositions inevitably leads to the ques-
tion of what, if any, limitations courts do or should impose on discovery
of trial experts.
IV. LIMITATIONS
Policy arguments aside, Rule 26(b)(4) suggests three ways to limit dis-
covery. First, the court may predicate further discovery of testifying ex-
perts on a party's willingness to reimburse his opponent.85 Second,
advanced methods of discovery are available only by discoverer's motion
and court order.8 6 Finally, some scholars believe the discretionary scope
provision in subdivision (b)(4)(A)(ii) implicitly incorporates the
Knighton prohibition against discovery of auxiliary facts and opinions.87
At first glance, the Advisory Committee's expressed purpose to en-
hance cross-examination supports an incorporation theory. 8 Further ex-
amination of the Committee's note, however, undermines this
80. Id. at 683.
81. Id. at 684. See also supra note 116.
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id.
84. Moreover, in voluntary expert depositions, which operate without court intervention, a ma-
jority of practitioners employ no special questioning restrictions other than the general relevancy
standard. See Day, Expert Discovery Under Federal Rule 26(b)(4): An Empirical Study in South
Dakota, 31 S.D.L. REv. 40, 50 (1985).
85. See supra note 8.
86. See supra note 1. One court has interpreted the court order requirement as an intentional
safeguard against discovery of facts and opinions for purposes other than cross-examination. In re
IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust Litig. 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977).
87. See supra note 74.
88. See supra note 6. Restricting discovery to an expert's expected testimony at trial arguably
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interpretation. First, the Committee adopted only Knighton's procedural
framework, making no mention of its substantive limitations.89 Second,
the Advisory Committee's note suggests that courts should order reim-
bursement for fees and expenses when the discoverer seeks information
favorable to his own case.9 Finally, the 1966 proposal for Rule 26(b)(4)
explicitly incorporated the Knighton prohibition; the 1970 amendment
omitted this qualifier.9
Herbst v. International Telephone & Telegraph Corp.,92 unlike
Knighton, suggests unlimited expert discovery. The Herbst court held
that "[o]nce the traditional problem of [unfairness] has been solved, there
is no reason to treat an expert differently than any other witness."93 The
court remedied unfairness concerns by requiring the discoverer to shoul-
der a proportionate share of the adversary's fees and expenses.9 4
Even if reimbursement cures unfairness, the Herbst court erroneously
treated an expert trial witness as an ordinary witness. Experts accumu-
late relevant information through intensive education, training, and expe-
rience. They are not actors or viewers in the events underlying
litigation.95 They have no obligation to disclose their knowledge.
Rather, expert witnesses own a limited commodity-information-and
expect a fair return for providing it to the tribunal.
In addition, unlimited discovery would have a negative impact on the
truth-finding process. In complex litigation, expert testimony is often
serves the goal of effective cross-examination. See Knighton v. Villian & Fassio Co., 39 F.R.D. 11,
13 (D. Md. 1965).
89. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
90. Id.
91. See Graham, Part One, supra note 9, at 909. In the context of expert depositions, at least
one court has agreed with the argument that the Committee failed to incorporate Knighton into Rule
26(b)(4). Weekley v. Transcraft, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 683, 685 (N.D. Il. 1987). See supra notes 79-84
and accompanying text for a discussion of Weekley.
92. 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
93. Id. at 530-31. Cf. WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 2, § 2029 ("In view of all that can be said
for treating expert information like any other information it is surprising that the amendment does
not go farther along these line than it does.") (footnote omitted).
94. Id. Professor Graham concurs in the proposition that qualified reimbursement adequately
addresses notions of unfairness. Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 192. He states: "If any unfair-
ness results .. . straightforward and adequate relief is available pursuant to Rule 26(b)(4)(C)(ii)
which requires the examining party to pay a fair share of the fees and expenses the opposing party
incurred in securing the expert's testimony." Id. (footnote omitted).
95. If an expert does have firsthand knowledge as an actor or viewer in events underlying a
legal action, the information is freely discoverable under Rule 26(b)(1) and Rule 26(b)(4) is inappli-
cable. See supra note 33.
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outcome determinative.9 6 Therefore, the best experts facilitate an effec-
tive truth-finding process. Subjecting experts to extensive discovery,
however, might discourage their participation in the system.97  More-
over, expanding expert discovery will perpetuate the already lengthy and
expensive pretrial process, a result contrary to the purposes of the Fed-
eral Rules.98
In order to reach some middle ground between a highly restrictive
analysis and unlimited discovery, judges and commentators have sug-
gested various limitations on expert discovery. One approach would al-
low additional discovery only if discovery already conducted, via
interrogatories or otherwise, is insufficient for effective cross-examina-
tion.99 A shortfall of this test is the fact that interrogatories will rarely be
sufficient." ° More importantly, as one scholar noted: "[r]eliance upon a
purported examination of sufficiency is merely another verbalization of
Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) that similarly fails to provide a predictable standard
for decision-making."10 1 In either case, decisions on further discovery
are left to the court's discretion. 10 2
96. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note. Notable examples include patent,
condemnation, or food and drug cases. Id.
97. See, e.g., Norfin, Inc. v. International Business Mach. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 531-32 (D.
Colo. 1977) (disregarding expert's threat to discontinue participation if required to disclose informa-
tion in violation of contractual obligations to other clients). Professional experts, who routinely sell
their services, might be more willing to undergo multiple depositions and production of all founda-
tion materials and documents prepared contemporaneously with litigation than leading engineers or
academicians. Some courts have considered the burden extensive discovery may place on testifying
experts. See, e.g., Mutual Fire, Marine & Inland Ins. Co. v. Jenckes Mach. Co., No. 85-0586-S (D.
R.I. 1986) (WESTLAW, DCTU database) ("The prophylaxis of the rules fairly balances the dis-
cover's need to know with the legitimate protection of the discoveree's experts, requiring the [dis-
cover] to learn what it will face in the manner least onerous to the [experts].")
98. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are to be "construed to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action." FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
99. See, e.g., Delcastor, Inc. v. Vail Associates, 108 F.R.D. 405, 410 (D. Colo. 1985) (denied
the plaintiff's motion to depose adversary's expert when production of the expert's report suffi-
ciently guaranteed effective cross-examination); Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301,
304 (E.D. Pa 1983) (allowed deposition of the plaintiff's expert because answers to interrogatories
were general and conclusory and the written report was not detailed, and both were insufficient to
advise the defendant of the factual basis for the plaintiff's expert opinion).
100. See supra text accompanying note 9.
101. Graham, Part One, supra note 9, at 929-30. The author explained further that a court
inclined toward full-blown discovery will tend to find the answer to interrogatories insufficient, while
a court favoring limited discovery will tend to find the answers to interrogatories sufficient. Id. at
930.
102. Similarly, allowing each court to impose whatever showing of need it deems wise as a pre-
condition on the movant under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) is subject to criticism. See, e.g., Mutual Fire,
Marine & Inland Ins. Co., No. 85-0586-S (D. R.I. Feb 18, 1986) (WESTLAW, DCTU database)
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Professors Friedenthal and Long and Judge Thomsen's opinion in
Knighton suggested other limitations on expert discovery. 10 3 As stated
previously, the Advisory Committee ostensibly rejected Thomsen's re-
strictive analysis."° However, Thomsen's approach gains some support
in the context of depositions. 105 Friedenthal and Long, unlike Thomsen,
disfavored a scope restriction. Rather, they advocated the procedural
safeguards of timing and mutuality to prevent unfairness.10 6
The complementary concepts of timing and mutuality require recipro-
cal disclosure of expert information shortly before trial.107 Time con-
straints guarantee independent preparation. 08  The Advisory
Committee's note hints at a timing restriction to prevent the affirmative
use of discovered expert information."° However, Professor Graham
observes that "j]udicial decisions granting or denying motions for fur-
ther discovery generally have ignored the restrictions of mutuality and
timing." ' o
Timing has received short shrift by the courts. However, Graham's
claim as to mutuality is incorrect. In a long line of cases, the courts have
imposed reciprocal disclosure obligations on parties seeking discovery of
trial experts. Judicial decisions have required the simultaneous exchange
of information through interrogatories,I' stayed depositions until the
(requiring a showing of "good cause" to gain approval of further discovery); Feller v. Board of
Educ., State of Conn., 583 F. Supp. 1526, 1529-30 (D. Conn. 1984) (extraordinary circumstances not
shown, requiring further discovery).
103. See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
104. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text.
106. Graham, Part One, supra note 9, at 904-05.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 904. The premise is that time restraints will preclude a party from relying on its
opponent's expert information by forcing independent investigation and preparation. Moreover,
Professor Long feared "that a party granted discovery of an adversary's expert before being required
to select his own expert would lead to the expert witness eventually selected more likely taking
questionable positions in response to discovered testimony." Id. at 905 n.50.
109. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) advisory committee's note.
110. Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 192. The timing restriction suggested by Friedenthal
and Long may be impracticable given judges and practitioners' concern over delays in discovery. Id.
If parties were unaware of an opponent's expert information until shortly before trial, the court
could face a deluge of last minute motions for further discovery.
Ill. United States v. John R. Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971). In a govern-
ment condemnation proceeding, the court ordered both parties to proceed with interrogatories pur-
suant to subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i) and stated in pertinent part:
[T]he mutual and simultaneous exchange of the factual information and opinions of the
parties' respective experts, in the manner provided for in the rules (i.e., interrogatories and
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movant engages its own expert,1 12 and conditioned motions to compel
production on mutual disclosure." 13
Mutuality is an effective device to control perceived unfairness and de-
ter the advocation of questionable positions at trial." 4 Though some
scholars have suggested reimbursement is an adequate prophylaxis," 5 a
mutual disclosure requirement offers a distinct advantage. Whereas the
deep-pocket will gladly pay a proportionate share of the often substantial
fees and expenses incurred by an opponent," 6 the average plaintiff may
be unable to justify the cost of exhaustive discovery of an adverse expert.
On the other hand, a reciprocal disclosure obligation is equitable because
each party, regardless of financial means, must be willing to disclose its
own expert information in return for that of its adversary. Moreover,
reciprocity has proven an equitable solution in the analogous context of
medical report discovery.' 17
then further discovery, if necessary), will best facilitate a clarification of the issues and
prepare all counsel for orderly and expeditious presentation at trial.
Id. at 373.
112. Rupp v. Vock & Weiderhold, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 111, 113 (N.D. Ohio 1971) (subdivision
(b)(4)(A)(ii) empowers courts to stay the deposition of an adverse expert until the movant engages its
own expert and complies with subdivision (b)(4)(A)(i)); Kozar v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 320
F. Supp. 335, 375 (W.D. Mich. 1970) (denied the defendant's motion to take deposition of adver-
sary's expert trial witness where the defendant declared the intention to forego retention of an expert
until after the deposition).
113. Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95, 98 (W.D. Mo. 1983); Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 91 F.R.D. 393, 399 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
114. See supra notes 2, 108. Professor Graham warned that imposition of timing and mutuality
requirements would delay discovery until the eve of trial and hamper counsel's preparation process,
Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 191-92. However, these two procedural devices are not interde-
pendent. The traditional notion of timing discovery a short time before trial is unwise. Separate
implementation of the mutual disclosure requirement, however, will not delay the discov-
ery/preparation process. To ensure timeliness, the courts could set a reasonable deadline for the
accumulation of expert information by both parties. Thereafter, the first party to pursue discovery
would trigger the reciprocal disclosure obligation.
115. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
116. See, eg., Weekley v. Transcraft, Inc., 113 F.R.D. 683, 685 (N.D. Ind. 1987) (a husband and
wife incurred expert fees of $15,232.75 for testing of defective welds and expenses of $9,894.35 to
purchase the defendant's tractor-trailer so their expert might conduct the tests).
117. FaD. R. CIV. P. 35(b)(2). Rule 35 allows a court-ordered physical or mental examination,
upon motion, of any person whose mental or physical condition is in controversy and provides that
the person examined or a party representing the person may discover the resultant report or the
examiner, subject to the following condition:
By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination or by taking the deposition of the
examiner, the party examined waives any privileges he may have in that action or any
other involving the same controversy, regarding the testimony of every other person who
has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect of the same mental or physical
condition.
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Finally, the actual practice of the federal bar, at least during voluntary
discovery, differs markedly from the bifurcated subdivision (b)(4)(A)
procedures. In the most comprehensive study to date, Professor Graham
surveyed judges and practitioners to determine the conduct of expert dis-
covery under the Federal Rules.' He concluded discovery of experts
actually approaches that of ordinary witnesses and, therefore, the Court
should amend Rule 26(b)(4) to comport with actual practice and the
drafters' intentions.' 19 Additionally, the survey revealed that examining
parties rarely discovered information favorable to their case-in-chief and,
when they did, the resultant prejudice was insubstantial.1 2° From this,
Graham suggests that the Advisory Committee's concerns over unfair-
ness were exaggerated. 12
Graham's survey and conclusions appear flawed in several respects.
First, the survey primarily reflects voluntary discovery between the par-
ties. 122 Graham does not attempt to separate undisputed expert discov-
ery from fully litigated discovery. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
are more than a manual for the practitioner. They must also serve the
federal judge faced with a hard case. The court should not amend Rule
26(b)(4) in accordance with routine practice at the expense of future par-
ties with legitimate reasons for resisting unlimited expert discovery.
Second, Graham maintains that amending Rule 26(b)(4) to allow un-
limited discovery would satisfy the intentions of the drafters of the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. However, these drafters clearly indicated that
Rule 26(b)(4) provides sufficient discovery of trial experts to carry out
effective cross-examination. 23 Thus, the intentions of the Rule 705 Ad-
visory Committee seem contrary to Graham's proposed amendment.
Courts should give controlling weight to the Rule 26(b)(4) Advisory
Committee until its rationale for restricted discovery is discredited.
Ultimately, Professor Graham's proposal rests on the observation that
concerns of unfairness under Rule 26(b)(4) are exaggerated. However,
Id.
118. Graham, Part Two, supra note 2.
119. Id. at 202. Here, Graham refers to the drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence, namely
Rule 705, which places the burden of uncovering the facts and assumptions underlying expert testi-
mony on the cross-examiner. See Graham, Part One, supra note 9, 896-97. He notes that adequate
pretrial discovery of the trial expert is essential to accomplishment of Rule 705's purpose. Id. at 897.
120. Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 191.
121. Id. at 192.
122. Id. at 184.
123. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note.
1988]
Washington University Open Scholarship
804 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
the survey reveals that affirmative use of an adversary's expert informa-
tion is not uncommon. 124 Moreover, the author himself refuses to abro-
gate the unfairness doctrine. Rather, he views reimbursement as
sufficient protection against potential discovery abuse. 125
The recent trends toward equalizing discovery of expert and ordinary
witnesses has negative implications, not only for the truth-finding and
pretrial processes, 2 6 but also for the attorney-expert working relation-
ship. '27 Negative effects on the attorney-expert working relationship are
most apparent in the context of motions to compel production. In Hew-
lett-Packard and Fauteck,12 s for example, the line between legal reason-
ing and engineering or statistical reasoning, respectively, is highly
attenuated. By granting unrestricted discovery, courts undermine future
counsel's attempts to translate technical opinions into valid legal argu-
ments. Such discovery forces the attorney to work independently of the
trial expert to avoid discovery of mixed work product. Similarly, the
Eliasen decision, requiring production of any material considered but re-
jected by the testifying expert, 129 forces counsel to carefully screen all
information before dissemination to the expert. Logically, foundation
materials rejected by the trial expert would be most helpful to the exam-
ining party's case and present the greatest threat of unfairness.
V. CONCLUSION
Discovery of an adverse party's expert information is essential to effec-
tive cross-examination, prevention of surprise, and the narrowing of is-
sues at trial. However, unlimited discovery is unnecessary to achieve
these goals. Moreover, unlimited discovery presents opportunities for
unfairness and threatens to weaken adversarial effectiveness and the
truth-finding process. The drafters likely took these variables into ac-
count in adopting a limited form of expert discovery. Imposition of a
124. See Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 191. Furthermore, federal courts remain attentive
to concerns of unfairness. See, eg., Weekley v. Transcraft, Inc., 113 F.R.D 683, 685 (N.D. Ind.
1987); Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 92 F.R.D. 393, 399 (N.D. Il. 1980).
125. See Graham, Part Two, supra note 2, at 192. For a discussion of the weakness of the reim-
bursement remedy, see supra text accompanying notes 115-17.
126. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
127. See supra note 65; Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 595 (3rd Cir. 1984).
128. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 116 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (discussed
supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text); Fauteck v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 91 F.R.D. 393
(N.D. II. 1980) (discussed supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text).
129. Eliasen v. Hamilton, 111 F.R.D. 396 (N.D. Ill. 1986) (discussed supra notes 51-54 and
accompanying text).
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mutuality requirement would, however, solidify the bifurcated approach
of subdivision (b)(4)(A). Nevertheless, Rule 26(b)(4) is an effective
means of balancing the conflicting interests presented by expert discovery
and should be retained.
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